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T H E OPENING OF A MASS of papers at the British Public Record Office on the 
history of Newfoundland in the 1940s has rekindled the debate over the 
circumstances in which the province became part of Canada in 1949. The 
question at issue was, and is: did Newfoundlanders decide their own 
constitutional future after the war or was Confederation engineered by Great 
Britain and Canada? Conspiracy theories were popular in Newfoundland at the 
time and have never really died out. What are the facts? The events leading up to 
Confederation cannot be understood without reference to what happened to 
Newfoundland in the 1930s. As an export-oriented and debtor country, New-
foundland was economically savaged by the Great Depression and quickly 
pushed to the edge of bankruptcy. In 1933, with the agreement of the govern-
ment formed in St. John's the previous year by Frederick Alderdice, a Royal 
Warrant was issued from London appointing a commission "to examine into the 
future of Newfoundland and in particular to report on the financial situation 
and prospects therein".1 Chaired by Lord Amulree, a Scottish Labour peer, this 
royal commission advocated that Great Britain assume "general responsibility" 
for Newfoundland's finances; but it also recommended that Newfoundland give 
up democratic parliamentary government in favour of administration by a 
British-appointed commission.2 
This scheme was accepted by the Newfoundland legislature and the new 
"Commission of Government" was inaugurated in St. John's in February 1934. 
The new administration was responsible to the parliament of the United King-
dom through the Secretary of State for the Dominions and combined a governor 
and six commissioners. Three of the latter were chosen from Great Britain and 
three from Newfoundland. The whole arrangement was not meant to be 
permanent but to last until Newfoundlanders could support themselves again, 
whereupon self-government would be restored at their request.3 But no defini-
tion was given to self-supporting and no procedure was spelled out whereby 
responsible government might be resumed. These were critical omissions and 
left the British considerable scope for manoeuvre later on. Lord Amulree had 
investigated the possibility of Confederation as a solution to Newfoundland's 
problems but the idea had received a frosty reception in R.B. Bennett's Ottawa. 
The response of E.N. Rhodes, Bennett's Nova Scotian Minister of Finance, was 
especially chilling. "He was against Confederation", Rhodes told Amulree, "as 
1 See S.J.R. Noel, Politics in Newfoundland (Toronto, 1971), p. 210. 
2 Newfoundland Royal Commission 1933 Report (London, 1933), pp. 201-2. 
3 Great Britain, The Public General Acts, 1933-34, p. 10. 
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the Newfoundlanders would really in effect become another Ireland — not in 
the racial sense, but a nuisance and always grumbling and wanting something".4 
During its first five years the Commission of Government effected many 
administrative changes and promoted various development schemes but New-
foundland remained economically downtrodden and was hit badly by the reces-
sion of 1937-38. Only an annual grant-in-aid from the United Kingdom permit-
ted the Commission to balance its books in these years. In the summer of 1938 
Governor Sir Humphrey Walwyn reported a more "bolshie" spirit among the 
St. John's hard-core unemployed and the following spring a Daily Express 
reporter concluded that the Commission was "overwhelmingly unpopular".5 It 
would take the outbreak of the Second World War to transform the Newfound-
land economy. In an age of air and submarine warfare the Island was 
strategically located, and Canada and the United States had obvious military 
interests there. It was their defence spending on the Island and in Labrador that 
got Newfoundlanders out of the economic quicksand. Early in the war Canada 
took over the running of Gander airport, built by Great Britain and Newfound-
land in the late 1930s and henceforth a crucial stopover point in the transatlantic 
ferrying of aircraft and supplies. Canada subsequently built air bases near St. 
John's and at Goose Bay, Labrador. St. John's was also a major centre of 
Canadian wartime naval operations and from 1941 the seat of a Canadian 
High Commission. In September 1940, Great Britain promised to secure for 
the United States "freely and without consideration" the grant for 99 years of 
base sites in Newfoundland.6 A lease was subsequently negotiated between 
Washington and St. John's and rapid development followed. During the summer 
of 1942, at the height of the base-building boom, approximately 20,000 New-
foundlanders were employed on defence construction.7 It was a measure of the 
turnabout in her fortunes that in 1941 Newfoundland made the first of a series of 
interest-free loans to the United Kingdom.8 
Economic change of this magnitude clearly had political consequences and 
these, not surprisingly, invited Whitehall's attention. As one Dominions Office 
official wrote in June 1942, "a new and vigorous policy with regard to New-
foundland" had become imperative.9 In the heyday of the Atlantic Charter, 
4 Amulree to Harding (draft), 21 May 1933, Amulree Papers, Bodleian Library. Quoted by 
permission of Lord Amulree. 
5 Dominions Office [DO] series 35, file 725/N8/12, p. 23, Public Record Office; Daily Express 
(London), 27 March 1939, p. 10. All subsequent DO references are to material in the Public 
Record Office. Transcripts of Crown-copyright records in the Public Record Office appear by 
permission of the Controller of H.M. Stationery Office. 
6 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Cmd. 6259 (London, 1941), p. 15. 
7 Newfoundland Government, Report of the Labour Relations Officer for the period June 1st, 
1942, to February, 8th, 1944 (St. John's, 1944), p. 13. 
8 DO 35/723/N2/73, p. 50; DO 35/749/N314/6, p. 77. 
9 DO 35/723/N2/73, p. 5. 
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Newfoundland's existing form of government had become an anachronism, 
perhaps even an embarrassment; the war was being fought for democracy but, 
except in municipal elections in St. John's, Newfoundlanders did not vote. In the 
autumn of 1942, Clement Attlee, recently appointed to the Dominions Office, 
visited Newfoundland, observing that the Commission of Government had not 
prepared for the restoration of self-government and had no clear purpose. Politi-
cal change, he believed, was both desirable and unavoidable, though the form it 
should take was by no means clear. "I sum up the attitude of most Newfound-
landers", Attlee wrote, "as being that of a man who having had a spell of 
drunkenness has taken the pledge . . . is tired of it and would like to be a mod-
erate drinker but does not quite trust himself'.10 In 1943 another prominent 
British official wrote that what Newfoundlanders "universally" wanted was "to 
be on their own with a comfortable grant-in-aid, and little responsibility".11 This 
was harsh but it was certainly true that Newfoundlanders, preoccupied with 
their sudden prosperity, never threatened the established political order during 
the war. The dissidents among them were divided in outlook and were easily 
deflected by Whitehall. 
On Attlee's initiative a three man parliamentary "goodwill" mission was dis-
patched to Newfoundland in the summer of 1943. Then, in December of that 
year, it was announced in Parliament that "as soon as practicable" after the war 
in Europe had ended, Great Britain would provide Newfoundlanders with 
"machinery. . . to express their considered views as to the form of Government 
they desire, having regard to the financial and economic conditions prevailing at 
the time".12 This promise meant business as usual for the Commission of Gov-
ernment in the interim and had two advantages: it would avoid any disruption of 
Newfoundland's war effort and would allow Newfoundlanders serving overseas 
to have a fair say in their country's future. Great Britain, the House of 
Commons was now also told, did not desire "to impose any particular solution" 
on Newfoundland but would be "guided by the freely expressed views of the 
people".13 
The thinking behind Whitehall's first public policy step was that Confedera-
tion, while perhaps the best long-term solution for Newfoundland, was "wholly 
out of the question" and was, moreover, "a matter in which His Majesty's Gov-
ernment in the United Kingdom could not directly intervene".14 The British 
further assumed that Newfoundland's existing prosperity was transitory and 
that the post-war period would be difficult. Though Newfoundlanders would be 
able to choose for themselves politically, in the British view they could not be 
10 Ibid., p. 63. 
11 DO 35/1141/N402/11, p. 9. 
12 DO 114/103, p. 24. 
13 Ibid. 
14 D O 35/1337/N402/1/11, pp. 208-09. 
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left to their own devices economically. If they were, Great Britain might soon be 
faced yet again with emergency requests for financial aid from St. John's. Above 
all, therefore, Great Britain wanted to avoid backing a Newfoundland govern-
ment that would be free to borrow and spend as it pleased. In 1944 the 
Dominions Office attempted to refine the policy declaration of December 1943, 
to take account of all these factors. On the constitutional side, Lord Cranborne, 
Attlee's successor at the Dominions Office, opted for a procedure first suggested 
by Independent MP A.P. Herbert, one of the parliamentarians who had gone to 
Newfoundland on the goodwill mission.15 The instrument through which New-
foundlanders would begin considering their constitutional future after the war 
would be a national convention elected, it was eventually decided, on a revised 
model of the pre-1934 local constituencies. 
The Commission of Government resisted the national convention proposal, 
fearing that an elected body of Newfoundlanders would put it on trial, act as an 
alternative government, or do both.16 But criticism from this quarter was 
brushed aside in London, and in any case the attitude of official St. John's 
changed when the Dominions Office made known the extent of the financial 
support it was willing to recommend for Newfoundland. In August 1944, Cran-
borne met in London with a three-man Commission of Government delegation 
which included two Newfoundlanders, L.E. Emerson and J.C. Puddester. 
Earlier he had asked the Commission to begin preparing a long-term recon-
struction plan for Newfoundland. Now he revealed that he favoured a special 
parliamentary act to fund over about ten years the capital cost of development 
schemes in Newfoundland which he and the Chancellor of the Exchequer had 
previously approved.17 Great Britain might also, he suggested, take over New-
foundland's sterling debt to offset the recurring costs of the development 
projects to be undertaken. This would be generous assistance indeed and the 
commissioners were quick to point out that its announcement before Newfound-
landers rendered an electoral verdict on their constitutional future would guar-
antee "an overwhelming vote in favour of a return to responsible government".18 
This being so, Great Britain would need some mechanism to safeguard her 
proposed investment. 
Cranborne's answer here was a Joint Development Board. This would be 
established when the British Parliament voted funds for Newfoundland and 
while the Commission of Government was still in office, so as to avoid the coin-
cidence of the restoration of self-governemnt and the imposition of new financial 
controls. As envisaged, the Board would be chaired by a judge of the Newfound-
land Supreme Court and have six other members, three nominated by Great 
15 Ibid., p. 210; DO 114/103, p. 32. 
16 DO 35/1338/N402/1/11, pp. 15-20. 
17 DO 35/1142/N402/31, pp. 7-8. 
18 Ibid., p. 9. 
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Britain and three by Newfoundland.19 Great Britain would also continue to 
appoint the Comptroller and Auditor-General of Newfoundland. The job of the 
Board would be to vet development schemes for funding, supervise the carrying 
out of work on approved projects, and report to both governments. New-
foundland would not be allowed to borrow externally without British agreement 
while the development scheme was in effect.20 Eventually, the Commission of 
Government put forward a reconstruction program with an anticipated price tag 
of $100 million;21 its plan was imaginative and presaged many of the develop-
ments which took place in Newfoundland in the 1950s. Assistance on this scale, 
the Dominions Office believed, would allow constitutional change to proceed 
without fear of the outcome, satisfy those parliamentarians who favoured gener-
osity towards a gallant little ally, and bury once and for all the lingering suspi-
cion that Great Britain had acted since 1933-34 as bailiff for Newfoundland's 
foreign bondholders.22 
Cranborne was now ready to advance his brief, with its inextricably linked 
political and economic elements, within the British government. There he met 
immediate opposition from the Treasury: Great Britain simply could not pay for 
what was being proposed. The expenditures contemplated in Newfoundland 
would be mainly in Canadian dollars (Newfoundland's currency was tied to 
Canada's) and London was already borrowing massively from Ottawa. Great 
Britain's own financial situation in the post-war world would be perilous, and 
she would hardly look credible in negotiating loans for herself with the United 
States and Canada if she was simultaneously attempting to prop up Newfound-
land. Great Britain had to look to her own concerns lest financial weakness 
endanger her position as a great power. "We have", one Treasury analysis con-
cluded, "to face the fact that the expenditure now proposed and many other 
forms of expenditure may be in themselves politically and economically very 
desirable, but it is a melancholy fact that we cannot afford them".23 
Cranborne resisted this approach, but the Treasury could not be moved and 
its view was unaffected by the coming to power of a Labour government in 1945. 
A new backer had to be found for Newfoundland, and Canada was the obvious 
candidate. What were the chances of success in Ottawa? Increasingly, the British 
believed they were good. Canada's stake in Newfoundland had been greatly 
increased by the war and the United States was now her direct competitor there. 
These new circumstances, the British believed, called for an active Canadian 
policy towards Newfoundland which would "gradually. . . build up an atmos-
phere of comradeship and practical co-operation in which the union of the two 
19 DO 35/1342/N402/29, p. 165. 
20 Ibid., p. 186. 
21 Ibid., pp. 54-55. 
22 Ibid., pp. 172-86. 
23 DO 35/1343/N402/32, p. 92. 
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countries could be seen to be in the common interest".24 When the Canadians 
made informal soundings in 1945 about Great Britain's intentions in Newfound-
land, Whitehall saw its opportunity. In September, P.A. Clutterbuck, a senior 
Dominions Office official who had served as secretary to the Amulree Commis-
sion and had remained close to Commission of Government affairs ever since, 
was sent to Ottawa to discuss the future of Newfoundland.25 He did not find his 
Canadian hosts very forthcoming but he had a strong case. If Great Britian 
could not help a new administration in St. John's and Canada stood aside, 
American influence might well grow in Newfoundland. An understanding was 
soon reached. Canada would not back Newfoundland directly or indirectly 
through Great Britain, but she would welcome her into Confederation. 
Henceforth Great Britain and Canada would be as one in pursuit of this objec-
tive. Confederation, they agreed, was Newfoundland's "natural destiny".26 
What could they do to forward their common cause? Clearly, they believed, 
the one thing they must not do was intervene directly in the constitutional debate 
among Newfoundlanders. Any hint of Anglo-Canadian cooperation to promote 
Confederation would be disastrous; the initiative for union had to come from 
Newfoundlanders themselves. It would, however, be possible for both parties to 
influence the development of Newfoundland opinion. Canada could do this best 
by welcoming any expression of interest in Confederation arising out of the 
national convention. If a signal came across the Gulf of St. Lawrence, Canada 
must be prepared to do "the handsome thing" by Newfoundlanders.27 Great 
Britain could "assist" the latter "to turn their thoughts to Canada" by making 
clear to them that they could not rely on London for further financial help.28 The 
British, of course, had another important lever in their ability to define the pur-
poses for which the national convention would meet and the electoral procedure 
by which Newfoundlanders would subsequently make their constitutional 
choice. 
The British had good cards and they played them skilfully. When the calling 
of a national convention was announced in Parliament on 11 December 1945, 
the Attlee government left itself great freedom for manoeuvre, while emphasiz-
ing to Newfoundlanders its inability to offer them much future help.29 The con-
vention would be an advisory body only, its job to recommend to the United 
Kingdom constitutional choices that might be put before the Newfoundland 
people in a referendum. Its views would clearly carry weight and be difficult to 
ignore; but it was not given final say on what would be on the referendum ballot. 
24 Ibid., p. 94. 
25 For his report see DO 35/1347/N402/54, pp. 98-102. 
26 Ibid., p. 91 
27 Ibid., p. 101. 
28 Ibid., p. 102. 
29 DO 114/103, pp. 54-63. 
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This prerogative the British kept carefully to themselves. 
In the event, the national convention, which assembled in St. John's on 11 
September 1946, following an election notable for its low voter turnout, decided 
to send delegations to Ottawa and London. The group that went to London was 
received politely but negatively. In offering thumbnail sketches of its members, 
K.C. Wheare, Fellow of All Souls and British-appointed constitutional advisor 
to the national convention, wrote, "I cannot believe that the resources of the 
Dominions Office will fail to cope easily and happily with these men".30 They 
did not. British officialdom's special gift for saying no was on this occasion 
employed to full advantage. In effect the visit of the delegation served only to 
give the British another opportunity to demonstrate just how bare their cup-
board really was. The delegation that went to Ottawa was accorded a very 
different reception. One of its members was Joey Smallwood, who had emerged 
among the convention delegates as the leading spokesman for Confederation. 
He and his colleagues were warmly received by Mackenzie King's government 
and returned to St. John's having worked out a possible scheme of union. 
Before disbanding, the national convention recommended to Great Britain two 
possible forms of government for Newfoundlanders: "Responsible Government 
as it existed prior to 1934" and "Commission of Government".31 When Small-
wood had moved in the convention that the choice of Confederation also be 
recommended, his motion had been defeated 29-16. Undeterred, he had taken his 
case to the people, calling his opponents "twenty-nine dictators" and organizing 
a big petition in favour of what a majority of his national convention colleagues 
had spurned.32 Much has been made of his success in this enterprise but he was 
really facilitating the inevitable. The British no doubt welcomed a pretext to add 
Confederation to the ballot but they really did not have to be persuaded to do 
so. Their final policy step, announced in Newfoundland on 11 March 1948, was 
masterful and was taken after close consultation with officials in St. John's and 
Ottawa, where P.A. Clutterbuck, freshly knighted, had gone as High Commis-
sioner in 1946. The referendum would offer three choices — revised versions of 
the two recommended by the national convention, and Confederation. The 
form of words on the ballot was as follows: "1 . COMMISSION OF GOV-
ERNMENT for a period of five years"; "2. CONFEDERATION WITH 
CANADA", "3. RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT as it existed in 1933".33 
Interestingly, the formal justification advanced to the governor of Newfound-
land for including Confederation did not mention the petition Smallwood had 
organized. Great Britain's initiative was justified because the issues involved in 
union with Canada had been "sufficiently clarified" to enable the people of 
30 DO 35/3446/N2005/13, p. 27. 
31 DO 114/103, p. 134. 
32 Noel, Politics in Newfoundland, p. 254. 
33 Acts, of the Honourable Commission of Government of Newfoundland, 1948 (St. John's, 1948), 
p. 49. 
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Newfoundland to pronounce on Confederation and because of the support this 
additional choice had commended in the national convention.34 Three choices 
rather than two meant, of course, that a referendum might not produce an 
absolute majority for any one. Recognizing this and believing that majority 
support was crucial in so basic a decision, the British ruled that a second referen-
dum on the two most favoured options would have to be held if the first failed to 
meet this requirement. 
All elections hinge upon particular historical circumstances and there can be 
no doubt that the decisions made by Great Britain and Canada from 1945 on-
wards were important in establishing the framework of politics in which New-
foundlanders voted in 1948. But to influence is not to engineer. Once the form of 
the ballot and the procedure for voting were decided upon, Newfoundlanders 
were on their own and they had real choices. Rumours persist of electoral 
irregularities in Newfoundland in 1948, but not a shred of evidence has been pro-
duced to substantiate them. Great Britain and Canada had certainly worked to-
gether to put the choice of Confederation before Newfoundlanders but they 
could not and did not make that choice for them. The British were uncertain of 
the outcome in Newfoundland and had well-developed contingency plans to 
reintroduce responsible government should the vote go that way. If Smallwood's 
role in the national convention and in getting Confederation on the referendum 
ballot was perhaps less important than has heretofore been thought, there is no 
denying his achievement on the hustings. He did not win a "fixed" bout but a 
winner-take-all, bare-knuckle fight-to-the-finish. Indeed, on 3 June 1948, after 
the first round, he and his associates found themselves behind. On this occasion 
69,400 votes were cast for responsible government, 64,066 for Confederation 
and 22,311 for continuing the Commission system.35 But the result of the run-
off, held on 22 July, was 78,323 for Confederation and 71,334 for responsible 
government.36 These figures represented respectively 52.34 per cent and 47.66 
per cent of the popular vote. Smallwood had triumphed and Great Britain and 
Canada had succeeded — but only just. 
Is it surprising to find confirmed in the papers at the Public Record Office 
that Great Britain and Canada favoured a particular outcome in Newfoundland 
after the war? Not really. Given the substantial interests both countries had in 
Newfoundland, the real surprise would be to find that they did not have 
clearly-defined policy goals. Nor is it surprising to find that Great Britain and 
Canada had reached an understanding about the future of Newfoundland. 
Historians may not previously have known the details of Anglo-Canadian nego-
tiations in the 1940s, but they have never doubted that Great Britain and 
Canada were players rather than spectators. Newfoundland's union with 
34 DO 114/103, p. 143. 
35 Ibid., p. 191. 
36 Ibid., p. 192. 
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Canada was a complex diplomatic, constitutional and political event. It could 
not have been anything else and cannot otherwise be understood. Great Britain 
and Canada undoubtedly pursued their self-interest vis-à-vis Newfoundlanders 
but that too is neither surprising nor shocking. And it does not follow that 
because they did so they had necessarily to disregard the best interest of New-
foundland. Again, there were limits to what the British and Canadians could do 
to achieve their objectives. It is one thing to have the last word on what appears 
on a referendum ballot, as the British did in Newfoundland in 1948; it can be 
quite another thing to win the referendum, as René Lévesque discovered in 1980. 
Ultimately, in a fair and democratic electoral contest, Newfoundlanders had to 
decide their constitutional future themselves. If they had not wanted Con-
federation, they had other substantial choices before them. This was well 
understood at the time and should not now be obscured. 
Perhaps the one real surprise at the Public Record Office is not that the 
British wanted Newfoundland to join Canada but that the Dominions Office for 
so long clung to the notion that Newfoundland could resume self-government 
with British financial support. Critics of Confederation and the means by 
which it was brought about in Newfoundland would do well to ponder the plan 
the Dominions Office had worked out for Newfoundland in 1944. If this had 
been implemented, Newfoundland might well have regained self-government but 
her freedom of action as an independent country would have been severely 
limited by the financial controls the British intended as the price for their con-
tinued support. As premiers of a Canadian province, Joey Small wood and his 
Progressive Conservative successors have known no such constraints. Argu-
ably, Newfoundland found greater independence within the loose structure of 
Canadian federalism than it could ever have achieved on its own. When Sir 
P.A. Clutterbuck made a nostalgic visit to Newfoundland in 1950, he was 
amazed at how fast Smallwood's government was moving economically and 
how far it intended to go. If the administration he had helped plan in 1944 had 
come into existence, things would have been very different. In effect the relation-
ship St. John's achieved with Ottawa through Confederation was the very one 
that London was above all determined to avoid for itself. Newfoundland had 
found a backer but her backer could not necessarily control her financial course. 
There was no Dominions Office or Treasury in Ottawa to rein in Joey Small-
wood, or Frank Moores or Brian Peckford. 
All this, of course, means nothing if one believes as an article of faith that 
Newfoundland was the victim of an Anglo-Canadian plot. The fact that some 
files listed at Kew relating to Newfoundland affairs in the 1930s and 1940s 
remain either closed or, in one case at least, are "wanting" (in British archival 
parlance) will encourage such thinking. What has been held back, however, may 
well have more to do with personality than policy, though here there can be no 
certainty. On the other hand, the voluminous and comprehensive body of 
information that has been released lends cold comfort to those Newfound-
Newfoundland and Confederation 119 
landers who now seem to hold a grudge against their own past and dream on of a 
glory that might have been but never was — before or after the upheaval of 
1934. Conspiracy theories of history have a life of their own, for no amount of 
contrary evidence can ever conclusively refute them. After all, it is always 
possible to believe that the "real" evidence has been destroyed or hidden or the 
official record cunningly falsified, and that only when the secret archives are 
opened (or the long-lost diary found, and so forth) will the "true story" at last be 
told. Such notions are hardy perennials, especially in the case of historic events 
where the margin between success and failure, victory and defeat, was razor-
thin, as it was in Newfoundland in 1948. 
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